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Abstract. In the present paper we undertake to link democracy with a set of indicators 
for economic freedom and financial crises, using panel data analysis. The sample 
covers annually the period 2000-2012 for the EU, the USA and Japan. The results 
point out, that political stability is positively related to the set of economic freedom 
indicators and negatively to financial crises, because greater economic freedom 
influences positively investment and economic growth, while financial crises, which 
lead to austerity policies, which again lead to recession-depression, increases 
dissatisfaction of citizens with the working of democracy (Georgiou, 2011) and thus, 
to the rise of extremist parties. Our findings support the idea that democratic stability 
is linked to economic stability and growth and vice-versa. 
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1. Introduction 
Democracy and economy are linked from ancient through modern times. 
Stable and durable democracies either at single state level, or for federations are 
linked to stable, prosperous and growing economies.    
 The first well established democracy, that of ancient Athens, was based on a 
well-functioning and prosperous economy, which permitted the establishment of a 
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substantial state budget. This covered, for the first time in history, not just military 
expenses, but programs of public works (in mainly two periods, that of Pericles 
during the second half of the 5
th
 century, and of Lycurgus 338-323 BC), education 
and participation fees for the democratic bodies refer (Amemiya, 2007; Kyriazis, 
2009).
1
           
 The same was true for the first Greek federations, such as the Aetolian and 
Achaean, which were again based on a strong economic basis where some key 
institutional elements were also present: free market type of economy, property rights 
protection, legal binding of contracts as far as commerce is concerned, banking 
services such as maritime loans,
2
 regional mobility of labour and capital, and 
trustworthy coinages which were making commercial transactions easier and faster 
(Mackil, 2013; Economou and Kyriazis, 2013; Economou, Kyriazis and Metaxas, 
2014).  
Through the ages, one can mention much more modern paradigms, by starting 
for example, with the United Provinces (UP, also known as the Dutch Republic) and 
England after the Glorious Revolution of 1688.
3
 These two historical cases, which are 
considered as two of the first early modern European states which achieved economic 
growth were again based on free market economy, international commerce, property 
rights protection, stable political systems (during the 18
th
 century), functional and 
trustworthy (in value) coins and innovative institutional mechanisms, such as the first 
ever recorded functional joint stock companies, banking services and the stock market 
                                                          
1
 Education comprised the so-called theorika payments, fee given from public budget to enable poor 
Athenian citizens to follow the four days long theatrical plays, which had an education function 
(Kyriazis and Economou, 2015). It was a compensation for the income they were loosing by not 
working during these days. Participation fees called eclessiastika, were again paid out of the public 
budget to poorer Athenian citizens to enable them to participate to the citizen’s Assembly, the main 
decision making body in ancient Athens, again as a compensation for income loss. 
2
 For the ancient Athenian banking system and commercial transactions Cohen (1973, 1997) offers a 
detailed analyses.  
3
 The UP were characterised by a mixed political system, democratic at the federation and provinces 
level, aristocratic at the base, cities level (Davids and ‘t Hart, 2012). For the transformation of the 
Dutch and the English economy towards free market and  international commerce since the late 16
th
 
century, which further deepened  after the Glorious Revolution in England see among others (North 
and Weingast, 1989; de Vries and van der Woulde, 1997; Rodger, 1997; Munro, 2007; Kyriazis and 
Metaxas, 2011;  Roy, 2012, Richards, 1929, repr. 2013). 
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(Schmitthoff, 1939; Lawson, 1993, 53; Gauci, 2000; Gelderblom, 2003; Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson, 2005; Munro, 2007; Van Nieuwkerk, 2009; Kyriazis and 
Metaxas, 2011, Roy, 2012).  
Thus, we argue to this point that the strong relationship between economic 
market mechanisms, economic growth, political liberalism and democracy, which was 
strongly advocated as a system of principles by famous economists and political 
thinkers such as Hayek (1973) is verified for both modern and pre-modern economies. 
On the other side, economic crises linked to political instability and in some cases, to 
the fall of democracy, as in Germany with the rise of Nazism (after winning the 
elections of 1933) or in some Latin American countries, as for example, the fall of 
Allende and military dictatorship in Chile in 1973.       
Economic crises or recessions contributed to the breakup of federations in 
modern times, as the fall of the Soviet Union after 1989 testifies. More recently, 
financial crises have led to changes in governments and smaller or greater political 
instability, as in the cases of Mexico, Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea (Geithner, 
2014). Economic recession after financial crises and slow economic growth and 
recession in many EU countries, have led to changes in governmental parties, like in 
today’s Portugal, France Italy, Cyprus and Greece linked to the rise of extremist anti-
European parties in France (Marie Lepen), the UK (Nigel Farage) and Greece 
(Golden Dawn political party).       
 In Greece in particular, after the beginning of the crisis and depression of 
2009, there have been four government changes and four elections (October 2009, 
twice in 2012 and January 2015) up to January 2015, eg. during a period of less than 
six years. There is a substantial literature linking stability to economic factors, such 
as, for example, taxation or economic crises, usually in partial analysis. When 
taxation rises excessively, citizens gradually loose their trust in the political system 
and vice-versa (Dunning, 2005; Malhotra and Carnes, 2008; Kaufmann, Kraay and  
Mastruzzi, 2010; Estrada, Mutascu, and Tiwari, 2011; Mutascu, Estrada and Tiwari, 
2012; Svensson, Urinboyev, and Astrom, 2012; Vasileiou, 2014). 
In our paper we attempt to analyse political stability through a more global 
approach, combining previous partial approaches. The paper is organized as follows: 
In the next section we outline our model, followed by the econometric methodology, 
the results and ending with our conclusions. 
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2. The model4          
We use the Economic Freedom of the World data for the 2000-2012 period as 
a global approach because this is a composite index, being an average of many partial 
indices, measuring various economic and political aspects. The index comprises five 
main areas, size of government legal system and property rights, sound money, 
freedom to trade internationally and regulation, each area comprising again some sub-
indices.          
 The legal system area for example induces as sub-indices judicial 
independence and impartial courts. We consider, this to be a very important political 
(and not only economic) indicator, because it illustrates one of the basic foundations 
of modern democracy, the separation of powers, the legislative, executive and 
judiciary. Independent and impartial courts are a safeguard not only of property rights 
but of democracy itself, if they take a stand against political abuses by governments 
against their citizens. During periods of crises, governments tend to increase such 
abuses. Impartial courts (Constitutional courts where they exist) have put barriers 
against such abuses recently in Portugal, France, Greece etc., condemning 
government legislation in some cases as unconstitutional.
5
      
 Other indicators, such as the size of government in total and bureaucracy costs 
in particular (sub-elements of regulation) affect not only the economic, but also the 
political situation. Bigger governments linked to untransparent bureaucratic 
regulations and administrative requirements frequent changes in taxation rules, lead to 
higher fraud and corruption. This again reduces government’s legitimacy in the 
perception of their citizens, which in the longer run can be detrimental to democracy 
itself. As Learned Hand (1872-1961), a prominent American judge and avid supporter 
of free speech argued, “Freedom lives in the hearts of men and women. If it dies there, 
                                                          
4
 One can find supportive evidence concerning our argumentation in this section in Georgiou (2014). 
5
 In Greece for example the Supreme Administration Court (Greece does not have a Constitutional 
Court) has condemned many recent laws, as undemocratic-unconstitutional. In fact there has never 
been before (after Greece’s reestablishment of democracy in 1974 a situation in which so many laws 
have been declared unconstitutional during such a brief period (1974-2014). This substantiates our 
claim that abusive and undemocratic behavior by governments increase during periods of crises. 
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no law, no constitution can keep it alive”.6 The same is true for democracy. If faith in 
democracy dies in the hearts of citizens, democracy will fall, as it did in Italy in 1922 
and in Germany in 1933.
7
 
 
2.1 Model Formulation 
Our model can be presented by the next equation: 
 
psit = c0 + c1 tsit + c2 crisisit + errorit                         (1)                               
 
Variable [ps] stands for the Political Stability Indicator. Variable [ts] stands 
for the total score index (of World Economic Freedom Indicators). Finally, [crisis] is 
a dummy variable representing the world economic–financial crisis having the value 0 
in all years before 2008 and the value 1 for 2008 and afterwards. The subscript i 
stands for the country, while t for the year. The sample covers Western Europe, Japan 
and the United States for the period 2000 – 2012 and is based on data being extracted 
for the period 2000 – 2012 by the Economic Freedom of the World provided by the 
Fraser Institute (see details in table 3). Thus, the balanced sample has 234 
observations in total.  
 
2.2 Econometric Methodology
8
 
Before starting the estimation of model (1) through the Eviews software one 
can see that there is no unit root (1) in Appendix B (tables 4, 5).  Τhis means that all 
variables are stationary and one can estimate the model. The equation (1) and all tests  
are elaborated through the Eviews software package. The detailed results are shown in 
table 1, while the diagnostics (based on Halkos, 2003) in table 2 (see Appendix A). 
For Equation (1) there are basically two types of estimation method, the “fixed” and 
“random” effects. The appropriate choice depends on whether one treats αi’s as some 
fixed numbers or ‘random drawings’ from a specific distribution. As the correlation 
                                                          
6
 Dilliard, I. (1952), The Spirit of Liberty: Papers and Addresses of Learned Hand. New York: Knopf. 
7
 Economists have examined the issue of corruption and fraud under the principal-agent problematic. 
8
 For the methodology we provide here we are based on Baltagi (2001), Davis (2002), Gujarati (2003) 
and Halkos (2003).   
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structure of the error term is ignored, a more efficient estimation method would be the 
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) provided that there is no correlation between the x’s 
and the α’s. GLS requires weighting the observations of y and x by Σ –(1/2): 
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First one obtains an estimate θ by estimating the equation: 
 
)()( ..
΄
. iitiitiit uuxxyy                                                (2) 
 
Once the component variances have been estimated, one forms an estimator of the 
composite residual covariance and GLS transforms the dependent and regressor data 
(Baltagi, 2001; Davis, 2002).  
 
2.3 Econometric Results  
We observe that estimated equation (1) meets the three required criteria of 
homoskedasticity, specification and normality and absence of serial correlation. 
Further, there is no unit root. Hence, only the above model (1) is robust. At (95%) all 
coefficients are statistically significant. The constant term is positive, the coefficient 
of [ts] is positive, while that of [crisis] is negative. The positive impact of [ts]  on [ps] 
indicates that the higher the [ts] is, then the higher the [ps] becomes. On the contrary, 
the negative impact of [crisis] on [ps], indicates that [crisis] reduces [ps]. It should be 
noted that the afore-mentioned two independent variables explain the 25% of the total 
variation of the dependent variable [ps]. This becomes clear by looking at the value of 
determination coefficient R
2
 (table 6, in appendix B). In economics it means that 
political stability is explained by [ts] and [crisis] by 25%, which is too high to be 
neglected by the policy makers. 
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3. Conclusion 
Our model supports the hypothesis that a well-functioning democracy goes 
hand in hand with stable and growing economy. As the ancient Athenians knew, as 
exemplified in Demosthenes dictum First Olynthiac Speech, 20:“we need money 
Athenians and nothing can be done without it”. Democracy and economy mutually 
reinforce each other. Democracy usually guarantees better than absolutist regimes 
property rights, which again is one of the basic prerequisites for long-run economic 
prosperity and nation’s strength.        
 In early modern history for example, more democratic nations, with 
institutions that guaranteed property rights, individual freedom and enterprises, like 
the United Provinces and England (United Kingdom after 1707) had faster economic 
growth and prosperity than more absolutist countries which did not guarantee 
property rights, freedom etc, like the Asian empires, China under Ming the Tsing 
(Manchurian) dynasties, the Indian Mungal empire or the Ottoman, but also more 
absolutist European nations like the Spanish empire and France (Kennedy, 1989, ch. 
1; Rodger, 1997; Ormrod, 2003; Kyriazis and Metaxas, 2011; Kyriazis, 2012b). 
 Strong economies enable democracies to undertake redistributive policies, as 
initiated by ancient Athens, and these policies (under the modern form of welfare 
programs like medicate, minimum pensions etc) create a community of interests, 
which again is the “glue of democracy”.9 In times of crisis, welfare and redistributive 
policies decrease, as in our model’s findings, and this again leads to citizen’s 
dissatisfaction with democracy and thus to the rise of extremist parties.  
 In particular, for the EU today, there is a grave danger that the austerity 
policies, if considered by the European citizens to be imposed by the EU, which 
shows a great democratic deficit
10, will lead to a “delegitimisation” of the EU, which, 
                                                          
9
 The 4
th
 century Athenian orator Demades called theorica the “glue of democracy”. Today’s China 
seems to be an exception, combining an undemocratic single party dictatorship political regime with 
high economic growth. Acemoglou and Robinson (2012) indicate that other modern absolutist such as 
the Soviet Union showed substantial growth during the same periods, but ultimately failed. They 
believe that the same will happen to China if it does not democratise itself. 
10
 We have examined in detail the issues of community of interest and the EU’s democratic deficit in 
Economou and Kyriazis (2013) and Economou, Kyriazis and Metaxas (2014). 
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if not inverted, may cause severe strain (Georgiou, 2011)
11
. We have indicated in the 
introduction the rise of euroscepticism and the anti-European parties. Government 
policies that does not have a bottom up legitimization in the eyes of their constituents 
erode the prestige of the policymakers who impose them. In such cases citizens feel 
more and more reluctant to “defend the system” according to Weingast (1997).  
 Thus, democratic leaders and governments have to be very careful when 
implementing economic policies. There is absolutely no excuse to invoke economic 
necessity in order to introduce undemocratic laws (as the former Greek governmental 
parties discovered in the 2015 elections). Some austerity measures were necessary in 
many countries, but the timing was probably wrong because it deepened the recession 
which had already started in 2009.       
 At the EU level, economic measures imposed to face current problems, like 
public debt, have to be very finely balanced with long-term aims of European 
integration. A too strong dose of austerity may be to the detriment of long-term aims, 
if it convinces many European citizens that the EU is responsible for their current 
woes.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
TABLE 1. Results in Brief 
Method GLS Period SUR weights 
c 11,267 
p-value 0,000 
ts 0,676 
p-value 0,000 
crisis -0,336 
p-value 0,000 
Adjusted R
2
 0,246 
Durbin_Watson 1,960 
Jarque - Bera 2,362 
Note: For n = 234 (at 95%), dU   = 1,805. The results in detail are in table 6. 
 
 
12 
 
TABLE 2: Diagnostic Tests
12
 
TESTS GLS Period SUR 
weights) 
Critical values 
(at 95%) 
Heteroskedasticity 1,624 3,037 
Heteroskedasticity 1,605 3,037 
Heteroskedasticity 2,797 3,841 
Heteroskedasticity 2,242 7,815 
RESET1 0,313 3,841 
RESET2 0,243 5,991 
RESET3 0,183 7,815 
Normality 2,362 5,991 
 
 
Test 1: Regression of the squared residuals on X. That is, t,11t
2
t vγxu   
Test 2: Regression of absolute residuals on X. That is, t,22tt vγx|u|   (a Glejser test) 
Test 3: Regression of the squared residuals on Yˆ  
Test 4: Regression of the log of squared residuals on X (a Harvey test)
 
Test 5: Regression of residuals on 
2Yˆ  
Test 6: Regression of residuals on 
3Yˆ  
Test 7: Regression of residuals on 
4Yˆ  
Test 8: Normality test (Jarque Bera)  
 
  
                                                          
12
 The diagnostic tests are based on Halkos (2003). 
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TABLE 3. Countries of the Sample 
Country Period 
Austria 2000 - 2012 
Belgium 2000 - 2012 
Cyprus 2000 - 2012 
Denmark 2000 - 2012 
Finland 2000 - 2012 
France 2000 - 2012 
Germany 2000 - 2012 
Greece 2000 - 2012 
Ireland 2000 - 2012 
Italy 2000 - 2012 
Japan 2000 - 2012 
Netherlands 2000 - 2012 
Norway 2000 - 2012 
Portugal 2000 - 2012 
Spain 2000 - 2012 
Sweden 2000 - 2012 
UK 2000 - 2012 
USA 2000 - 2012 
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APPENDIX B 
 
TABLE 4 Unit Root Test for [ps] 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  PS    
Sample: 2000 2012   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
User specified lags at: 1   
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
Balanced observations for each test   
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -3,92929  0,0000  18  198 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
PP - Fisher Chi-square  52,0957  0,0403  18  216 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi -square distribution. 
     All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
 
 
TABLE 5 Unit Root Test for [ts] 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  TS    
Sample: 2000 2012   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
User specified lags at: 1   
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
Balanced observations for each test   
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -3,12603  0,0009  18  198 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
PP - Fisher Chi-square  51,3658  0,0466  18  216 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. 
     All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
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TABLE 6. The Regression Results in detail 
 
Dependent Variable: PS   
Method: Panel EGLS (Period SUR)  
Sample: 2000 2012   
Periods included: 13   
Cross-sections included: 18   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 234  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
Period SUR (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 11,26703 0,700285 16,08919 0,0000 
TS 0,676301 0,078895 8,572177 0,0000 
CRISIS -0,336124 0,060415 -5,563582 0,0000 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0,252472     Mean dependent var 4,016779 
Adjusted R-squared 0,245999     S.D. dependent var 8,031440 
S.E. of regression 0,995974     Sum squared resid 229,1436 
F-statistic 39,00917     Durbin-Watson stat 1,960051 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,000000    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared -0,980949     Mean dependent var 16,01880 
Sum squared resid 607,2301     Durbin-Watson stat 0,146747 
     
      
 
